By: Preston Johnson
Fueled by an eclectic mix of consistent tropical storms that have brutalized their limited arable land, poor farming infrastructure that has led to farmer hostility, and insufficient rations for its common people,[i] the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is on the verge of another serious famine reminiscent of the one in the 1990s.[ii] COVID-19 has forced its leadership to consider accepting more humanitarian aid than their self-reliant ideology would approve of.[iii] All of this has led to an egregious malnutrition rate of 41%, with two in five North Koreans lacking access to basic living necessities.[iv]
What can be blamed for this? After all, North Korea’s southern neighbor shares the same peninsula with the same topography, tropical storms, and less-than-optimal farmland.[v] However, South Korea has managed quite well with proper farming maintenance.[vi] American backed sanctions have made relations rigid, but the United States has still offered aid for COVID-19 and have done so in the past for the country’s most recent famine.[vii] For the most part, malnutrition in North Korea is entirely in the hands of North Korea’s stubborn leadership and poor farming management.
Notwithstanding tropical disasters, South Korea has higher rice production of 539,000 compared to 389,000 kg.[viii] This difference can be largely attributed to shortages of modern farming necessities such as fertilizer, tractors, mechanized operation, fuel, and irrigation facilities.[ix] While that difference may not seem like much on its face, other factors further limit the amount of such yields that make it to those in need. North Korea has a command economy, meaning their economy is entirely centralized by the government.[x] Due to the government limiting the amount of crop yield the farmers can keep for themselves, farmers are showing up to work less frequently, with a staggering 60% attendance rate, at the same time stashing some of the yield for themselves to keep from starving.[xi] Unlike North Korea, South Korea adjusts to farming setbacks such as storms and droughts through high levels of agricultural management, such as better cultivation skills of the farmers and improved irrigation systems.[xii]
For the most part, Kim Jong Un has stuck by the original farming philosophy of the country’s founder, Kim II Sung, advocating for four areas of emphasis: mechanization, irrigation, electrification and intensive use of agricultural chemicals.[xiii] This approach led to rapid agricultural growth in the 1980s, but was soon halted by the famine a decade later.[xiv] However, he has hinted at some new policies for improving crop turnout, such as Juche farming, or “planting the right crop in the right field at the right time,” to combat the inconsistent reliability of focusing entirely on rice and corn on all plots of land.[xv] He has also brought the idea of a “field responsibility system” to put more long-term control in the hands of farmers.[xvi] It is important to note that most of this is nothing more than a plan beginning to form. One instance of his plan coming to life is the construction of a new hospital in Pyongyang after he had emphasized the importance of science and technology.[xvii] At the same time, he has spent millions on ski resorts limited to wealthy residents rather than use that money for aid[xviii], so we will just have to wait and see if this agricultural reform will actually come into practice.
While North Korea is insistent upon a self-reliance ideology, this isolation in global trade has left them greatly reliant on food and other humanitarian aid, especially through the COVID-19 pandemic.[xix] The United States is a historically anti-communist country, even having its own federal rule that prohibits assistance to communist countries in almost all circumstances.[xx] However, one such exception is humanitarian aid, which includes not only COVID-19 relief, but relief for mass starvation.[xxi] After the wake of the 1990s famine, the U.S. supplied over $1 billion in food and energy assistance.[xxii] It is uncertain if the US will repeat this assistance if there is another widespread famine, as Kim Jong Un has recently rejected COVID-19 aid from the U.S. due to concerns over spreading the virus.[xxiii] North Korea has also rejected such aid from their southern neighbor[xxiv], but continues to greatly rely on food and other forms of aid from their northern neighbor, China.[xxv]
Bringing all of this together, North Korea is at quite a crossroads. They need to act strong and fast, primarily through improving their farming techniques, otherwise they are destined for another famine. As I have mentioned, the U.S. and South Korea are the only countries from which North Korea has denied aid. As of late, Kim Jong Un has persistently denied such aid, but it will be interesting to see if he shows some leniency as their crop yields continue to be unsatisfactory and their malnutrition rates continue to rise.[xxvi] Kim’s plan for agricultural management is somewhat hopeful, as he has at least shown empathy to farmers by giving them more ownership of their collective farms, but there has been no word regarding an increase in the amount of food they can keep for themselves. As long as Kim can stop spending money on resorts for the wealthy elite and instead funnel that money into agricultural management improvements, North Korea’s future can still be looked at somewhat optimistically.
[i] Ha Yoon Ah, N. Korean Farmers are Showing up to Work Less than Before, Daily NK (Mar. 17, 2020, 10:00 AM), https://www.dailynk.com/english/north-korean-farmers-showing-up-work-less-before/ [https://perma.cc/YHF5-YYH3].
[ii] Erin Blakemore, North Korea’s Devastating Famine, History.com (last updated Sept. 1, 2018), https://www.history.com/news/north-koreas-devastating-famine [https://perma.cc/2L7F-HV3Z].
[iii] Choe Sang-Hun, U.S. Supports Aid to North Korea for Fighting the Coronavirus, N.Y. Times (Feb. 14, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/14/world/asia/coronavirus-north-korea-sanctions.html [https://perma.cc/66ZB-JKRG].
[iv] Blakemore, supra note ii.
[v] Jae-Hyun Ryu et al., Different Agricultural Responses to Extreme Drought Events in Neighboring Counties of South and North Korea, 11 Remote Sens. 15, 1773 (2019).
[vi] Id.
[vii] Mark E. Manyin & Mary Beth Nikitin, Cong. Rsch. Serv., RS21834, U.S. Assistance to North Korea (2008).
[viii] Sang-Hun, supra note 3.
[ix] Id.
[x] Prableen Bajpai, How the North Korean Economy Works, Investopedia (last updated Nov. 2, 2020), https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/013015/how-north-korea-economy-works.asp [https://perma.cc/93DB-H62C].
[xi] Yoon Ah, supra note 2.
[xii] Ryu, supra note 5.
[xiii] Randall Ireson, Game-Changing Agricultural Policies for North Korea?, 38 North (Feb. 16, 2014), https://www.38north.org/2014/02/rireson022414/ [https://perma.cc/E37Y-ELMJ].
[xiv] Id.
[xv] Id.
[xvi] Id.
[xvii] Samantha J. Pitz & Peter Makowsky, Pyongyang General Hospital: A Bright White Beacon After the Rains, 38 North (Sept. 24, 2020), https://www.38north.org/2020/09/pyongyang092420/ [https://perma.cc/2FD3-3UYG].
[xviii] Gabbi Shaw, Go Inside the North Korean Ski Resort that Kim Jong Un Spent Millions to Build, Insider.com (Mar. 27, 2019), https://www.insider.com/north-koreans-in-winter-2019-2.
[xix] Heesu Lee, Storms, Covid Raise Fear of Worst North Korea Famine Since 1990s, Bloomberg Green (Oct. 15, 2020, 6:00 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-10-15/storms-covid-raise-fear-of-worst-north-korea-famine-since-1990s [https://perma.cc/75LW-PR82].
[xx] 22 U.S.C.A. § 2370 (West).
[xxi] Id.
[xxii] Manyin, supra note vii.
[xxiii] Choe Sang-Hun, North Korea, Fighting to Hold Back Virus and Floods, Says No Thanks to Outside Aid, N.Y. Times (Aug. 14, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/14/world/asia/north-korea-floods-coronavirus.html [https://perma.cc/UJ9M-ANKL].
[xxiv] Id.
[xxv] Reality Check, North Korea: Who is Sending Aid?, BBC News (June 19, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-48637518 [https://perma.cc/CX94-9HUF].
[xxvi] Lee, supra note xix.