Natural Resource

Application of the Bankruptcy Code to Mineral Rights in Space

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By: Brad Butler, Notes Editor

In 2010, entrepreneurs Peter Diamandis and Eric Anderson founded Arkyd Astronautics,

[i]

which they later renamed Planetary Resources, with the intention of developing the technology to extract natural resources from asteroids.

[ii]

Recent estimates suggest that an average 98-foot asteroid could yield as much as $50 billion worth of platinum.

[iii]

Clearly, this could prove to be extremely lucrative, and the venture has caught the attention of several prominent investors such as filmmaker James Cameron, real estate developer Ross Perot, Jr., and Google co-founders Larry Page and Eric Schmidt.

[iv]

However, these space-mining missions are extremely capital-intensive and would cost several hundred million dollars each.

[v]

In light of the high costs, debt financing will likely be required.

[vi]

Unfortunately, creditors will not provide financing until there is a system in place that efficiently provides security for their debt and effectively ensures payment on that debt. In the United States, we have the bankruptcy system. However, it is unclear whether the Bankruptcy Code applies extraterritorially to assets located in space.

To answer this question, we must determine whether Congress intended for the Code to apply outside the United States. In E.E.O.C. v. Arabian American Oil Company, the Supreme Court of the United States held that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 did not apply to the conduct of an American employer abroad.

[vii]

The Court stated that Congress must clearly express an intention for the statute to apply abroad to rebut the presumption against extraterritoriality, and Title VII simply did not do so.

[viii]

However, the clear expression of intent is not a “clear statement rule” and a court should look to the statute in its entirety.

[ix]

Furthermore, when a provision of a statute does provide for some extraterritorial application, then the presumption against extraterritoriality is rebutted for that provision alone.

[x]

In the case of the Bankruptcy Code, it is clear that Congress provided no clear statement, but Congress did show a clear intention to apply the Code abroad. The grant of jurisdiction to the bankruptcy court extends to all property owned by the debtor wherever located.

[xi]

The “wherever located” language is also incorporated into the definition of property included in the bankruptcy estate.

[xii]

Therefore, Congress clearly intended for the court to have jurisdiction over the property of the estate, but a grant of jurisdiction does give rise to substantive rights.

Courts routinely apply the jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Code and look to local law when determining property rights. In Butner v. United States, the Supreme Court held that the Code did not articulate the priority of the secured creditors, so the Court looked to the local law of North Carolina.

[xiii]

In this case, the asteroids would certainly be the property of the company under the common law principle of ferae naturae

[xiv]

and the bankruptcy court would clearly have jurisdiction over the property. However, the problem then arises as to which law to apply. Here, the local law would be the governing law in space.

The major treaty that has served as the basis for all modern space law is the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (“Outer Space Treaty” or “OST”), in which Article VI provides for the possibility for private entities to conduct business in space and possibly own property.

[xv]

However, the OST does not discuss how the property rights are determined.

[xvi]

Another treaty, the Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (“Moon Treaty”) states that natural resources in space are considered “the common heritage of all mankind.”

[xvii]

Fortunately, the Moon Treaty has only 14 signatories, none of which are space-capable nations.

[xviii]

So, there is some ambiguity as to what the law actually provides. Under the OST, there is no clear answer as to whether a private company may own an asteroid, how long it could own the asteroid, or who actually owns the resources extracted upon return to Earth.

[xix]

Under the Moon Treaty, either everyone or no one owns all property and natural resources in space.

[xx]

So, it is unclear whether the company would even have the right to sell the natural resources once it brings them back to Earth. If they cannot be sold, then they have no value and would not benefit the bankruptcy estate. Creditors will not lend money to a company that cannot monetize its assets and provide the potential for repayment of the loan extended by the creditor. Therefore, Congress must pass legislation that providing a mechanism for determining property rights and the effects of those rights, or all interested parties must amend the OST. Until either of these two things is done, there is no rational basis for creditors to lend money to private companies seeking to engage in space mining or exploration and modern innovation will be further deterred.

_________________

[i]

John Cook, NASA vet and X Prize creator at the helm of secretive space robot startup Arkyd, GeekWire (July 8, 2011, 10:48 PM),

http://www.geekwire.com/2011/nasa-veteran-emerges-helm-arkyd-stealthy-space-travel-startup/

.

[ii]

Matthew Sparkes, Planetary Resources unveils cosmic plan 'to boldly go' and mine asteroids for gold and platinum, The Telegraph (April 24, 2012, 8:40 PM),

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/industry/mining/9222766/Planetary-Resources-unveils-cosmic-plan-to-boldly-go-and-mine-asteroids-for-gold-and-platinum.html

.

[iii]

Id.

[iv]

We’re on to Something, Planetary Resources,

http://www.planetaryresources.com/team/

(last visited Mar. 25, 2014).

[v]

Sparkes, supra note 2, at 1.

[vi]

Id.

[vii]

E.E.O.C. v. Arabian American Oil Company, 499 U.S. 244, 249 (1991).

[viii]

Id.

[ix]

Morrison v. Nat’l Australian Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 261 (2010).

[x]

Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 455-56 (2007).

[xi]

28 U.S.C. § 1334(e)(1).

[xii]

11 U.S.C. § 541(a).

[xiii]

Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979).

[xiv]

See Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175, 176 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805).

[xv]

Rand Simberg, Property Rights in Space, The New Atlantis (Fall 2012), pages 20-31,

http://www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/property-rights-in-space

.

[xvi]

See id.

[xvii]

Id.

[xviii]

Id.

[xix]

See id.

[xx]

See id.

You Can't Sit With Us! The Different Permitting Standards for LNG for Countries with and without U.S. Free Trade Agreements

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By: Ellen Black, Production Editor

Until recently, domestic production of natural gas was so low that the United States imported it in the form of liquefied natural gas (LNG) to LNG terminals built on the coasts.

[1]

 However, with the “shale-gas revolution made possible by fracking” and other drilling advances, natural gas is now much more accessible and domestically abundant. 

[2]

 Since natural gas cannot be stored like oil or coal, the glut of this resource must either be used or not drilled until it can be used or sold. This increase in supply, coupled with a constant demand, has resulted in a significant drop in the price of domestic natural gas, creating an artificially low price due to oversupply.

[3]

 Reasonably, natural gas companies want to increase demand by exporting LNG to countries without this resource, which will pay a much higher price,

[4]

 yet the current permitting requirements limit exportation.

The Natural Gas Act of 1938 (NGA), 15 U.S.C. § 717,

[5]

 governs the regulation of natural gas, and contains provision § 717b(a), which governs the exportation and importation of LNG using a standard of “benefiting the public good.” For the first time in decades, in May 2013, two permits to export LNG were conditionally granted, one in Louisiana and one in Texas.

[6]

 This represents a significant shift in this industry, and has opened the door to at least twenty other such applications to the Department of Energy (DOE).

[7]

 Originally, all applications for import and export of natural gas underwent the same process of review as analyzed under a public interest standard.

[8]

 However, as America promulgated more complex free trade agreements in recent years, it has become practice to subject applications for import and export to different standards of review for those countries with and without free trade agreements.

[9]

In the Energy Policy Act of 1992

[10]

, Congress amended the NGA to include sections 3(a) and 3(c) which govern differences in free trade agreement and non-free trade agreement country applications for export of natural gas. The Economic Regulatory Administration (ERA) is responsible for making the decision whether an application for export is “consistent with the public interest,” which is based on “various factors including security of supply, balance of payments, price of the import or export, national and regional needs for gas, and the eligibility of the purchasers and participants.” 

[11]

For export permits to free trade agreement countries, with the Energy Policy Act of 1992, there is now an “expedited application process.”

[12]

 This section also requires that these applications be deemed “consistent with the public interest” and that these applications be “granted without modification or delay.”

[13]

 As a result of the latter provision, the DOE does not conduct a full public interest analysis of these section 3(c) applications and cannot condition them “by insertion of terms which otherwise might be considered necessary or appropriate.”

[14]

 There are currently twenty countries with which the U.S. has free trade agreements concerning the treatment of natural gas.

[15]

For non-free trade agreement countries, there is a much more in-depth process as dictated by § 3(a) of the NGA, which provides that “the [Secretary of Energy] shall issue such order upon application, unless after opportunity for hearing, [he] finds that the proposed exportation or importation will not be consistent with the public interest.” 

[16]

 This creates “a rebuttable presumption that a proposed export of natural gas is in the public interest.”

[17]

 For countries without free trade agreements, the DOE issues a notice of the application for import or export in the Federal Register, publishes the Section 3(a) application and all subsequent pleadings and orders on its website, and invites interested persons to participate in the proceedings.

[18]

 In granting this application, there is “a wider range of considerations for a permit within the public interest review, includes in part environmental concerns, the domestic need for natural gas, and international considerations. 

[19]

 These “non-statutory” criteria are not exhaustive, and have changed over decades with each subsequent agency application. 

[20]

This difference in permitting schemes thus creates an unnecessarily complicated and bifurcated process for LNG permits. It is in the best interest of the United States to have more exportation LNG, and also a more streamlined and uniform process for permitting.

_________________

[1]

 Bryan Walsh, The Unintended Consequences of Exporting Natural Gas, Time (May 27, 2013), 

http://science.time.com/2013/05/27/natural-gas/#ixzz2iAT5ebSh

.

[2]

 Id.

[3]

 Id.

[4]

 Id.

[5]

 15 U.S.C. § 717 (2013).

[6]

 Zach Colman, DOE Gives Green Light to Controversial Natural Gas Export Project, The Hill E2 Wire (May 17, 2013, 1:30 PM), 

http://thehill.com/blogs/e2-wire/e2-wire/300459-doe-green-lights-controversial-natural-gas-exports#ixzz2iINmYCW2

.

[7]

 Id.

[8]

 Shani Harmon, Reining in the Natural Gas Bonanza, Legally: Whether U.S. Law and Policy Restrictions on Natural Gas Exports Are Consistent with International Trade Law, 25 Geo. Int'l Envtl. L. Rev. at 619 (2013).

[9]

 Id.

[10]

 42 U.S.C. § 7172 (2013).

[11]

 Report of the Committee on Natural Gas Imports and Exports, 1 Energy L.J. 165 (1980).

[12]

 Harmon, supra note 8, at 619.

[13]

 DOE's Program Regulating Liquefied Natural Gas Export Applications: Hearing on LNG Before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Subcommittee on Energy Policy, Health Care, and Entitlements (March 19, 2013) (statement of Christopher Smith, Acting Assistant Secretary for Fossil Energy).

[14]

 Id.

[15]

 Id.

[16]

 Harmon, supra note 8, at 620.

[17]

 DOE, supra note 13.

[18]

 Id.

[19]

 Id.

[20]

 Id.